

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

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LIMDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS BAGHDAD

KUWAIT PASS DOHA

GENEVA FOR MEPCDEL

LONDO FOR LAMBRAKIS

EO 11652: GDS

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SUBJ: JORDAN AND RABAT SUMMIT

1. SUMMARY: JORDAN ENTERS RABAT SUMMIT IN ISOLATED,

COMBATIVE AND SELF-VINDICATING MOOD BUT AT SAME TIME IS RELUCTANT TO ALLOW SUMMIT TO CLOSE DOOR IRREVOCABLY ON FUTURE JORDANIAN NEGOTIATING ROLE. JORDANIANS FEEL IN A LET-THE-CHIPS-FALL-WHERE-THEY-MAY MOOD OVER INCREASING PLO STATUS AND REGARDING PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION ISSUE. ON THE OTHER HAND, JORDAN BELIEVES, IF LOGIC PREVAILS, THAT IT HOLDS VERY STRONG CARD AS THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE ARAB NEGOTIATOR FOR WEST BANK TO ISRAELIS AND TO U.S. SIMILARLY, JORDAN BELIEVES THAT OTHER ARABS (ESPECIALLY SYRIA) ARE NOT READY TO LET PLO REPRESENT PALESTINIANS IN THEIR TERRITORY. JORDANIAN STRATEGY IS TO USE THESE ARGUMENTS TO PERSUADE EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA AND ARAB MODERATES TO CHOOSE PRAGMATIC PATH OF SUPPORTING EARLY JORDANIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WHILE CONSEQUENTLY LIMITING THEIR SUPPORT FOR PLO. EGYPT'S POSITION ON JORDAN'S ROLE IS CRUCIAL. IF EGYPT GIVES SOME LEVEL OF REASONABLY ACCEPTABLE TACIT SUPPORT TO JORDAN'S NEGOTIATING ROLE, WE SEE CHANCE OF JORDAN STAYING IN NEGOTIATIONS, EVEN AGAINST ARAB CONSENSUS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE SEE LITTLE JORDANIAN DISPOSITION FOR WORKING OUT ANY KIND OF ACCOMMODATION THAT (IT SEEMS FROM HERE) PLO WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT. END SUMMARY.

2. THIS TELEGRAM IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE AN ANALYSIS OF JORDAN'S POSITION PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT, DISCUSS SOME CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE SUMMIT, AND ATTEMPT TO RELATE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES O JORDAN'S POSITION.

3. JORDAN GOES INTO THE SUMMIT TECHNICALLY IN A DIPLOMATIC FREEZE. THIS WAS BROUGHT ON BY THE JORDANIAN REACTION TO THE CAIRO SEPTEMBER 21 TRIPARTITE COMMUNIQUE WHICH REINFORCED EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR THE PLO AS THE "SOLE, LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE" OF THE PALESTINIANS. JORDAN ADDED TO ITS POLICY POSITION AT THAT TIME (WHICH ALREADY INCLUDED A REFUSAL TO ATTEND GENEVA MEPC UNTIL SOME DISENGAGEMENT HAD TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN IT AND ISRAEL ON THE WEST BANK) A FURTHER STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN OTHER NEGOTIATING EFFORTS. THIS FREEZE
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WAS STATED AS TEMPORARY UNTIL RABAT SUMMIT CLARIFIED ARAB POSITION.

4. JORDANIANS HAVE PUBLICLY STATED THEIR VIEWS AS FOLLOWS:
(A) THEY WANT TO SEE SUMMIT TAKE A DECISIVE STAND FOR OR AGAINST THEIR CONTINUING TO HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN WEST BANK; AND
(B) THAT IF SUMMIT SHOULD DECIDE AGAINST THEM (AND LOGICALLY IN FAVOR OF PLO), THEY WILL WITHDRAW FROM HEIR RESPONSIBILITY. GOJ'S SUBSTANTIVE POSITION REMAINS THAT IT IS RESPONSIBLE UNDER RES 242 FOR REACQUIRING WEST BANK AND ARAB JERUSALEM, FOLLOWING WHICH IT WILL PERMIT EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION ON WEST BANK UNDER

INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. IN FACT KING HUSSEIN FEELS PLO IS NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF PALESTINIANS AND THAT HE HAS HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT WEST BANKERS AGAINST PLO IMPOSITION THERE. MEANWHILE RECENT THREATS BY FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS AGAINST KING HAVE NOT INCREASED HIS DISPOSITION TO ACCOMMODATION.

5. IN PRIVATE JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT MORE GUARDED THAN BLACK AND WHITE CHARACTER OF ABOVE VIEW WOULD INDICATE. THEY HAVE STATED THAT WHILE THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE SUMMIT REACH MAKE-OR-BREAK POINT FOR THEM FOR FUTURE, THEY EXPECT EFFORTS AT COMPROMISE. IT IS HERE THAT KING AND HIS ADVISORS PROBABLY DIVIDE SOMEWHAT, WITH KING FEELING THAT CONTINUED PRESSURE NEEDS TO BE APPLIED FOR A DEFINITIVE AND CLEAR-CUT SOLUTION, WHILE HIS SENIOR ADVISORS SEEM MORE PRONE TO FOCUS ON DEALING WITH WHATEVER EVENTUAL COMPROMISE EVOLVES. BOTH KING AND HIS CLOSE ADVISORS FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE MISTAKE FOR JORDANIANS TO PAINT THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER IN WHATEVER STATEMENT THEY MAKE. THEY ARE THEREFORE PLANNING A MODERATE DEFENSE OF THEIR POSITION WITH A REQUEST FOR SUPPORT FROM THEIR ARAB BRETHREN.

6. THEY CONSIDER THAT THEIR MAJOR TRUMP CARDS ARE TWO STRONG POSITIONS WHICH THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY REINFORCE IN CORRIDORS AND AT PRIVATE MEETINGS SURROUNDING SUMMIT. THESE ARE:

(A) FACT THAT ISRAELIS WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH ANYONE ELSE BUT JORDAN FOR WEST BANK AND THAT AS A RESULT ARABS
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CAN HAVE JORDAN AND NEGOTIATED RETURN OF ARAB TERRITORY OR PLO AND CONFIRMATION ISRAELI WEST BANK OCCUPATION, BUT NOT BOTH; AND

(B) THAT NO SELF-RESPECTING ARAB STATE IS PREPARED TO CONCEDE THAT PALESTINIANS UNDER ITS WING ARE NOT SUBJECT TO ITS AUTHORITY. THEREFORE JORDAN IS UNWILLING TO CONCEDE THAT PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN (WHO IN LARGE MEASURE ARE TREATED AS FULL JORDANIAN CITIZENS) SHOULD BE REPRESENTED BY PLO; CONVERSELY, JORDANIANS ARE PERFECTLY HAPPY TO CONCEDE THAT SOMEBODY ELSE'S RESIDENT PALESTINIANS MAY BE REPRESENTED BY PLO.

7. JORDANIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD PLO BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY HAS TENDED TO FOLLOW COMMON PATTERN. JORDAN CLAIMS CREDIT FOR BEING PRESENT AT CREATING OF PLO IN 1964, FOR CONTINUING TO SUPPORT IT AS A LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF SOME PALESTINIANS, AND FOR BEING WILLING TO TALK WITH IT AT ANY TIME PLO WISHES TO APPROACH GOJ. THEY ARE NOT OBVIOUSLY PREPARED TO RETURN TO PLO STATUS WHICH IT ENJOYED IN JORDAN IN PERIOD IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO 1970, NOR ARE THEY WILLING TO ALLOW PLO OR ITS SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS TO LAUNCH ATTACKS OR INFILTRATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST ISRAEL

FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY.

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8. PRIVATELY STRONG FEELINGS OF ANIMOSITY CONTINUE TO PREVAIL

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BETWEEN JORDANIANS IN KEY GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS AND PLO. MANY EAST BANKERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ANY EFFORTS TO ENHANCE STATUS OF PLO, PARTICULARLY AT JORDAN'S EXPENSE, AND WOULD PREFER TO OPT OUT OF ALL NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ANY CONDITIONS. JORDANIANS OF PALESTINIAN ORIGIN AND RECENT REFUGEES ARE OF MIXED MIND, BUT MOST TEND TO PROFESS SOME LOYALTY FOR HUSSEIN EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE NOT ADMIRING OR SUPPORTIVE OF HIS CLOSE ADVISORS.

9. JORDANIANS ARE ASSESSING SUMMIT AS A CRUCIAL TURNING POINT FOR THEM. WHILE THEY EXPECT EFFORTS AT A COMPROMISE, OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THEY HAVE NOT THEMSELVES THOUGHT ABOUT FORMULATING ANY SUCH PROPOSALS AND ARE PREPARED TO LEAVE THE INITIATIVE TO OTHERS. THEY LOOK TO EGYPT AS THE STATE WHICH WILL PLAY PREDOMINANT ROLE IN DETERMINING THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE. THEY HAVE RECEIVED WITH SOME SKEPTICISM A RECENT FLOOD OF EGYPTIAN PRIVATE REASSURANCES THAT EGYPT WILL SUPPORT JORDANIAN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WEST BANK AND PRESUMABLY ALSO ATTEMPTS TO EVOLVE A FORMULA WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR PLO REPRESENTATION OF PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN. RECENT EGYPTIAN PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAVE TENDED IN THIS DIRECTION, BUT LEAVE A LARGE GAP BETWEEN JORDAN AND EGYPT AS TO WHETHER GOJ OR PLO REPRESENTS THE PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK.

10. WITH EGYPTIAN SUPPORT, EVEN IF PRIVATELY GIVEN, JORDANIANS FEEL THEY HAVE SOME HOPE OF COUNTING ON SAUDIS TO UNDERSTAND AND SUPPORT WHAT JORDAN CONSIDERS TO BE THE "REALISM" OF ITS POSITION. JORDAN WOULD HOPE ALSO TO PULL ALONG MOROCCO, THE GULF STATES, LEAVING TUNISIA AND LEBANON TO GO WITH THEM SHOULD LATTER CONCLUDE IT WOULD PUT THEM ON THE RIGHT (AND POSSIBLY WINNING) SIDE.

11. JORDANIANS ARE CONVINCED THAT SYRIA WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE JORDAN IN FAVOR OF PLO. THEY SUSPECT THIS IS TRUE FOR TWO REASONS: (A) THAT SYRIA IS MUCH ATTACHED TO PLO AND HONESTLY AND SERIOUSLY CHAMPIONS PALESTINIAN CAUSE. AND (B) SYRIANS WOULD LIKE TO DISRUPT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE SEPARATE STEP-BY-STEP NEGOTIATIONS FOR EGYPT AND JORDAN, RATHER PREFERRING TO TAKE THE NEXT STEP FOR ALL THREE CONFRONTATION PARTIES SIMULTANEOUSLY, AS ONE GIANT STEP.

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JORDANIANS THUS BELIEVE THAT SYRIA WILL DO WHATEVER IT CAN TO RETARD OR STOP A SEPARATE NEXT STAGE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WITHOUT CONCURRENT AND ACCOMPANYING STEPS TAKEN BY SYRIA. LIBYA, IRAQ, KUWAIT AND ALGERIA ARE CONSIDERED TO BE IRRECONCILABLY OPPOSED TO JORDAN AND HUSSEIN AND UNSHAKEABLE IN THEIR DETERMINATION; LIBYA AND IRAQ BEING UNDERSTOOD TO BE OPPOSED TO NEGOTIATIONS IN ANY FORM AND THE OTHER TWO STRONG SUPPORTERS OF THE PLO.

12. IT CRYSTAL CLEAR IN JORDAN THAT WORLD SUPPORT FOR PLO HAS OBVIOUSLY GROWN, AT LEAST IN RHETORICAL SENSE, SINCE UNGA VOTE. HOWEVER JORDAN SEES AS STRONG ASSET IN ITS APPROACH US SUPPORT FOR GOJ AS NEGOTIATOR FOR WEST BANK WITH ALL THAT SUCH IMPLIES IN US WILLINGNESS TO EXERCISE ITS GOOD OFFICES IN CONNECTION WITH A NEGOTIATION. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE OBVERSE OF THIS STAND--THE UNWILLINGNESS OF US TO SUPPORT PLO IN SUCH A NEGOTIATING ROLE--IS ALSO OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE.

13. JORDANIANS HAVE FEW REAL ILLUSIONS ABOUT TRYING TO WIN ANY BATTLES WITH PLO ON ISSUE OF "PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION," BUT THEY DO PUT STRONG EMPHASIS ON TRYING TO GET CLEAR-CUT APPROVAL FOR THEIR CONTINUING TO NEGOTIATE FOR WEST BANK.

14. WHILE IN OUR VIEW A CLEAR-CUT FOR OR AGAINST RESOLUTION AT SUMMIT OF GOJ-PLO DIFFERENCES IS MOST UNLIKELY, FIND IT DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHAT VIEW JORDANIANS MIGHT TAKE OF ANY ONE OF A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE COMPROMISES. HOWEVER, WE ARE AWARE OF FACT THAT JORDANIANS WILL ATTEMPT TO LEAVE SOME DOORS OPEN SO THAT THEY CAN ADJUST TO WHATEVER COMPROMISES MIGHT BE EVOLVED. AT BARE MINIMUM, THEY WILL EXPECT SOME RHETORICAL "VICTORIES" FOR PLO BUT WILL WISH TO BE HANDED SOMETHING OF THEIR OWN IN THE WAY OF SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATING ROLE. POSSIBLE CONCILIATORY ELEMENTS ARE (A) JORDAN HAS NOT RETRACTED ITS SPRING 1974 ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT DOES NOT OBJECT TO SOME FORM OF PLO REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA (NOT NECESSARILY ONLY AS MEMBER OF JORDANIAN DELEGATION), AND (B) GOJ IS ALSO WILLING, WE BELIEVE, TO AGREE TO RESTRAINTS ON JORDANIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN WEST BANK, TO UN PRESENCE, AND TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF AUTONOMY BY WEST BANKERS (BUT NOT UNDER PLO DOMINATION) IN THE
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ADMINISTRATION OF ANY TERRITORY REGAINED BY JORDAN. THIS HOWEVER FALLS FAR SHORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY IDEA ADVANCED IN SEPTEMBER 21 TRIPARTITE COMMUNIQUE. THERE IS SOME CHANCE THESE ELEMENTS MAY FORM SOME BASIS FOR COMPROMISE ON WEST BANK ISSUE AT SUMMIT.

15. WE CERTAINLY DO NOT EXCLUDE JORDAN'S DROPPING OUT IF SUMMIT GOES OVERWHELMINGLY AGAINST GOJ. THAT WOULD LEAVE A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS WHICH JORDANIANS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO CONSIDER. ONE SCENARIO THEY ENVISAGE AS POSSIBLE WOULD BE DETERMINED IN LARGE MEASURE BY WHAT EGYPT IS ABLE TO GET FOR ITSELF AT SUMMIT IN THE WAY OF ENDORSEMENT FOR A NEW ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. IF EGYPT ALSO IS ISOLATED BY SUMMIT, OR FAILS TO RECEIVE A NEGOTIATING MANDATE BECAUSE OF AN UNCERTAIN VERDICT AT SUMMIT AND THEN CONTINUES ON ALONE, JORDANIANS WOULD CERTAINLY ALSO BE PREPARED TO TRY THE SAME THING. ALTERNATIVELY, IF EGYPT GOT A NOD AND JORDAN FAILED TO, AT MINIMUM WE WOULD EXPECT THAT

PRESENT TEMPORARY FREEZE BY JORDAN WOULD BE CONTINUED. JORDAN WOULD THEN WANT TIME TO RE-EXAMINE THE SITUATION.

16. IN LONG RUN, THE JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP BELIEVES SINCERELY THAT WHATEVER VEDICT THE SUMMIT REACHES, IT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CHANGE THE "REALISTIC" SITUATION THAT ISRAEL WILL NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH JORDAN. IN SUCH CASE, AND WHATEVER HAPPENS TO EGYPT, JORDAN MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO WAIT FOR A TIME AND THEN TRY INDEPENDENT NEGOTIATIONS. THEY MIGHT ALSO BE PERSUADED THAT WAITING WILL ENHANCE PROSPECT THAT ARAB STATES WILL SOON BECOME FRUSTRATED WITH NO PROGRESS ON THE WEST BANK, AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE, AND ASK JORDAN AGAIN TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING EFFORT.

17. FINALLY, JORDANIANS STILL IMPRESSED BY FACT THAT TACTICALLY IF THEY CAN GET BACK A PART OF WEST BANK, THEY WILL BE IN MUCH STRONGER POSITION IN FUTURE TO DEAL WITH PLO AND PALESTINIANS. THEY ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT IF SOME PALESTINIAN STATE EVER DOES EMERGE ON THE WEST BANK, ITS FIRST IMPULSE WILL BE TO MARCH EAST NOT WEST, AND ALSO THAT SYRIA IS MUCH INTENT ON CREATING A DAMASCUS-DOMINATED FEDERATION OF THE WEST BANK, JORDAN AND SYRIA.
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